In this paper, we consider the cybersecurity issue of ship information system (SIS) from a new perspective which is called opacity. For a SIS, its confidential information (named as "secret") may be leaked through the working behaviors of each Distributed Control Unit (DCU) from an outside observer called an "intruder" which is able to determine ship's mission state by detecting the source of each data flow from the corresponding DCUs in SIS. Therefore we proposed a dual layer mechanism to enforce opacity by activating non-essential DCU during secret mission. This mechanism is calculated by two types of insertion functions: Safety-assured insertion function ( f IS ) and Admissibility-assured insertion function ( f IA ). Due to different objectives, f IS is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret behaviors from a unsafe one, and the division of f IA is to polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We define the property of "I 2 eEnforceability" that dual layer insertion functions has the ability to enforce opacity. By a given mission map of SIS and the marked secret missions, we propose an algorithm to select f IS and compute its matchable f IA and then the DCUs which should be activated to release non-essential data flow in each step is calculable.
Introduction
With the development of ship technology, the ship system tends to be integrated and distributed which leads to a new research area named ship information system (SIS). Although different ships have different functions, all definitions found in literature for a SIS have one key feature in common. As firstly defined by us in Liu et al. (2014) , a typical SIS is composed by several independent subnets (sensor networks, display networks, etc.) and a total ship communication network which can exchange information (reference input, plant output, control input, etc.) among subnets and systems. Similar to a networked system, SIS research is categorized into the following two parts which are Information processing and Information transmission. The research on Information processing is mainly focused on service ability such as controllability, observability (Xing et al., Zhi) and reachability (Xing et al., 2015) , etc. Meanwhile, the core attention on Information transmission is service quality, such as anonymity (Wang and Wang, 2014; Kumari and Khan, 2014) and secrecy (Rabbachin et al., 2015; Liang et al, 2009) , etc. The application of these research results can ward off network intrusion and attacks, prevent the content of data flow from leaking. However, for a SIS, if the functions of each Distributed Control Units are confirmable, the on-going mission may also be revealed by detecting the publishing actions of each DCU. In order to find a solution of protecting some important mission states in SIS, a new property of Information Flow named as opacity should be considered in cybersecurity of SIS. Opacity was first introduced in computer science literature (Mazar e, 2004) and later investigated in Discrete Event System (DES) framework (Lin, 2011; Takai and Oka, 2008; Cassez et al., 2012; Wu and Lafortune, 2013; Falcone and Marchand, 2015; Bryans et al., 2008) .
Without losing generality, the model of SIS mission state can be also formulated as a DES and SIS is said to be opaque if its " secret" missions can be hidden from an undesirable external observer which is referred as intruder. The intruder is modeled to have full knowledge of the structure of SIS (include the function and characteristic of the data flow from each DCU), but can not obtain the content of each data flow. And the SIS is said to be opaque if for any secret mission, there must exist at least one other non-secret mission that observationally equivalent from the intruder. Due to the specificity of SIS, here we only consider about CurrentMission State Opacity (CMSO) which is similar to Current-State Opacity-SCO in Bryans et al. (2008) . For those systems which are not SCO, the mainly research point is ensuring opacity, which is mainly approached as Supervisory Control Theory (SCT) (Lin, 2011; Dubreil et al., 2010; Ben-Kalefa and Lin, 2011) and enforcement (Falcone and Marchand, 2015) . As what has been contrasted by Jacob et al. (2015) , the difference between SCT and enforcement is the way they preserve secret, SCT constrains the happening of secret by the controller while enforcement does not restrict system's behaviors but modifies its output to hide the reveal of secret. As there may exist multiinformation in a single data flow, not only for secret mission but also for normal mission, it is inadvisable to protect secret mission by restricting the publish of data flow. Thus we research on the enforcement of CMSO. There exist three basic implement methods to enforce opacity by modifying the output information to the observer, 1) deleting events, 2) adding events and 3) delaying the output. Among them, addition of events is a total non-intrusive approach and can be used in such system which a secret is not timeindependent. This approach named as "insertion functions" is first proposed by Wu and Lafortune in Wu and Lafortune (2012) .
As shown in Fig. 1 , regarding as a monitoring interface at system's output, the insertion function has the ability to modify the actual output behavior with fictitious factors by inserting additional observable events. The basic idea to design a suitable insertion function selection algorithm which can cheat the intruder to omit the actual secrets meanwhile the intruder could not learn the setting rule by analyzing the modified output observation with system's structure.
In this paper, we follow and expand the basic design rules of insertion functions which has been presented in Wu and Lafortune (2014) . Due to different objectives, f IS is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret behaviors from a unsafe one, and the division of f IA is to polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We define the property of "I 2 eEnforceability" for dual layer insertion functions if they have the ability to enforce opacity. By a given mission map of SIS and the marked secret missions, we propose an algorithm to select f IS and compute its matchable f IA and then the DCUs which should be activated to release non-essential data flow in each step is calculable.
To the best of our knowledge, security and opacity issues of ship mission state in SIS have never been addressed so far.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the typical SIS mission model, and defines the enforcement opacity problem which is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the proposed dual insertion function structure which used in the enforcement of opacity. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Structure of SISM

Basic structure of SIS
As shown in Fig. 2 , the structure of SIS we proposed here is similar to Raytheon Companys Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) which is one of late-model for USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000). The SIS network is a Double-loop Broadcast Network which connect C2I (Command, Control & Intelligence) system, 3 parallel-hosts monitoring system, HumaneComputer Interface (HCI) and dozens of DCUs which are located throughout the ship. And every sensor and actuator which belongs to different systems in the ship are added in this network through remote terminal units (RTUs) with the most nearby DCU. That means a data flow D m released by DCU m may include kinds of information that are needed in different systems. As a Broadcast Network in this structure, for each component in SIS, to detect the releasing of data flow is much easier than detecting receiving actions. And according to different sequences of releasing action from each DCU, the on-going mission of the ship is able to be determined.
SIS mission (SISM) models
If we consider each releasing action as an controllable event, the mission states of SIS can be modeled as deterministic finite state automaton, G ¼ (X, E, E int , E host , f, f c , X 0 ), which includes a set of mission states X, a set of release action events E, partial transition function f: X Â E / X, where f(x, e i ) ¼ y means when DCU i release its data flow to SIS network while mission x is running, the ship is proofed to run mission y instead, E int ¼ {e CCI , e HCI } denotes the data flow releasing of CCI and HCI, respectively, similarly E host ¼ {E host1 , E host2 , E host3 } means each releasing action from host, and a set of initial state X 0 . In addition, partial transition function is defined as f: X 0 Â E host / X 0 , where f(x, e hosti ) ¼ y means HOST i joining the calculating process of initial mission state y from x. And which should be mentioned, not all of mission states in X have actual definitions, some of them may be treated as staged mission states.
The running step of a normal SISM is shown in Fig. 3 . As a beginning flag of a SISM, the task is published by the user from HCI or SIS core from CCI which means e CCI or e HCI is one mark of setting a new mission starting at X 0 . Then the host analyzes this mission and decomposes it into several small submissions for each related DCU. It is a typical Hierarchical-cooperative Structure (HCS). Once a DCU receive its submission, it starts to control the plant through mounted RTUs. Accordingly, RTUs will collect data from correlated sensors and send them to DCU. In order to form a closed loop, according to the command from each submission, DCU n would only put necessary sensor data in the data flow, and the releasing action is denoted as e n . And we call mission state y as a cooperative mission by DCU m1 and DCU m2 , if f(x, e m1 e m2 ) ¼ f(x, e m2 e m1 ) ¼ y is satisfied. Meanwhile, DCU n1 is said to build a redundant structure with DCU n2 for mission state y, if there is f(x, e n1 ) ¼ f(x, e n2 ) ¼ y.
Let E* be denoted as the set of all finite strings over X plus the empty string ε, then f can be extended to X Â E* in the usual manner. For a given state S2X, the language generated by G from S is given by LðG; SÞ :¼ fs2E Ã : dx2Ss:t:f ðx; sÞ!g where the meaning of ! is "be defined". For simplicity, when S ¼ X 0 , the prefix-closed language L(G, X 0 ) is denoted as L(G). Hence, the event set are partitioned into the set of observable event E o and the set of unobservable event E uo , i.e., 
Which should be mentioned, the SIS mission (SISM) model just bring a minimal necessary releasing action strings for each mission. If the SIS is in a multi-task mode, the mission state y can not happen from x when DCU m releases its data flow without adding in all necessary information for y, even if there is f(x,e m ) ¼ y. Multi-task mode is a typical working style, due to the high computation ability of DCUs. In most cases, a DCU can add all necessary information it has for every on going missions in one data flow. So we assume that if there is f(x,e m ) ¼ y, once DCU m sends a data flow at mission state x, the mission state is trusted to be y. Imperfect information adding issue will be considered in the future. For now, the way to determine each mission state in a multi-task process is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm takes the observable release action q and a multi-task string set which include every on-going mission strings as input. Line 1e3, as q2E INT , which means a new mission has been published by HCI or CCI. As shown in Line 4e9, q is a mark of further computing by HOST. According to the analysis above, in Line 10e15, if this data flow is released by a DCU, every mission which need this data would be to next mission state.
Due to the calculations of Algorithm 1 and the hypothesis of DCU's working mode in SIS, the releasing action q would result in a new mission state for any task which needs the data from DCU q . Therefore, even if SIS is in a multi-task mode, every mission state is able to be determined which means a potential unsafe action string is able to be screened out from a multi-task string.
As for a middle scale SIS, there exist thousands of mission states and hundreds of DCUs, here in Fig. 4 , we only recite a partial example of SISM. According to the definition of
It can be seen that the general missions in G is published by HCI, and decomposed by HOST1. HOST2 can be regarded as a parallel computer of HOST1 for x 2 . DCU 4 is only a redundant device of DCU 1 during the running process to x 13 , besides DCU 2 and DCU 3 work cooperatively from mission sate x 13 to x 16 .
Choosing x 22 for example, the minimal necessary release action string is denoted as e HCI e HOST1 e HOST2 e 3 e 2 ðe 1 =e 4 Þ ½e 2 e 3 e Ã 1 e 2 e 1 e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 , where (e 1 /e 4 ) means redundant and [e 2 e 3 ] means cooperative relation. For a multi-task case, if the action string is e HCI e HOST1 e 1 e HCI e HOST1 e HOST2 e 3 e 1 e 2 , according to Algorithm 1, there are two mission action strings, one is e HCI e HOST1 e 1 e 3 e 1 at state x 8 , the other is e HCI e HOST1 e HOST2 e 3 e 2 at state x 12 .
In order to state the proposed enforcing opacity structure completely and comprehensively, without losing generality, in the following of this paper, every example during the analysis is based on Fig. 4 .
Secrets in SIS mission (SISM) models
The "secret mission" in a SIS is such a kind of information (such as activation of fire control radar, fault report of power system, etc.) which SIS wants to "hide" from an external observer, named as "intruder". These missions should not be restricted if they are on the list to be happened.
Here we purpose a sub system of
) where x n is the initial state and x n 2X. L(G suf (x n )) is the set of all substrings of L(G) which start from state x n . And there is X suf Àn 4X and E suf Àn 4E, which means for cx p 4X suf Àn , there always exists a
x sj is a secret mission state in a secret set X s , every state in G suf (x sj ) is also belonged to X s . And we define such secret x sj an original secret, if there dx ns 2X=X s and e2E, such that x sj ¼ f(x ns , e) is satisfied, and the set of original secrets in G is denoted as X os . Without any need of proof, G is safe if every original secrets in G are hidden from the intruder.
Based on Fig. 4 , the meaningful states of G are listed in Table 1 . And DCU 1 , DCU 2 and DCU 3 are located in the ship motion control system.
The secret we want to hide is x 3 , which means every state in X sufÀ3 should be hidden from the intruder. If the x 3 is protected completely, every state in X sufÀ3 is sensibly safe.
Preliminaries of enforcing opacity
Screening -holding projection
As defined in Wu and Lafortune (2012) , the insertion function has ability to insert any event in E o which looks identical to a system observable event. In order to distinguish between observable event and inserted event in this paper, we denote inserted event by attaching insertion label (subscript i or dashed feature), resulting in E i ¼ fe i : e2E o g. Projection P und is a natural projection that treats insertion transitions as unobservable. There is P und ðe i Þ ¼ ε, e i 2E i and P und (e) ¼ e, e2E o Similarly, projection P oi is used in the exclusion of event which is neither observable nor inserted, that means, given e2E∪E i ; there is:
M i is a mask which is not able to distinguish between inserted event and observable event. Given an event, there results
Here we propose another projection named screeningholding projection P sÀh to analyze admissible strings. P sÀh is a nature projection that treat queue jumping transitions as unobservable. Two strings r ¼ r 1 r 2 /r m and t ¼ t 1 t 2 /t n are given. The definition of P sÀh ((r)/(t)) is shown as follows: And for two strings r ¼ r 1 r 2 /r m and t ¼ t 1 t 2 /t n , if there exists r m ¼ t n and P sÀh ((r)/(t)) ¼ t, we reformulate it as P sÀh ððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t.
For given strings r and t, the screening-holding projection P sÀh ((r)/(t)) can be counted by Algorithm 2 which operates as follows. Power supplied by sub-grid 2 for area 1
Power supplied by sub-grid 3 for area 1 x 10 Fire-fighting monitoring for area 3
Activation of navigation system x 16 Activation of path planning mission
Control of fin stabilizer x 22 Patrolling mission Theorem 3. For two strings r and t, if P sÀh ((r)/(t)) ¼ t, there must exist a prefix of r, denoted as r p , such that P sÀh ððr p Þ=ðtÞÞ^t Proof. Based on t q we expand a string t q which as a result P sÀh ðr=t q Þ^t q , here t is a prefix of t q . As what has been proofed in Theorem 2, for the two prefixes t and r p , there must be P sÀh ððr p Þ=ðtÞÞ^t.
Insertion functions
An insertion function in this paper has the ability to take an observed event from the system, possibly inserts extra observable events, and then outputs the resulting string. In terms of the intruder, the extra inserted events are indistinguishable from genuine observable events. That is, the intruder does not recognize the virtual insertion label. Therefore, the intruder, observing at the output of the insertion function, cannot tell if the observed string includes inserted events or not. Given a modified string s2ðE o ∪E i Þ Ã from the insertion function, the intruder observes s under mask M i . We can also reconstruct the genuine string by applying projection P und to s. Which should be mentioned that the intruder is assumed to have no knowledge of the insertion function at the outset but it can detect the existence of insertion function by sensing unreasonable output behaviors.
The basic structure of insertion function we used in this paper is defined as f I :
Ã o E o which outputs a string with insertion parts based on the knowledge of system's historical and current observed behavior. Given a string t where P(t) ¼ s that has been executed in the system and the current According to the definition of P sÀh ((r)/(t)) and insertion functions, such substrings of r which cannot follow the event queue of t would be eliminated by P sÀh ((r)/(t)). Hence we have the following result: Lemma 1. For two strings r and t there must exist such insertion functions mechanism which as result is f str I ðtÞ ¼ r if P sÀh ððrÞ=ðtÞÞ^t. Proof. As P sÀh ððrÞ=ðtÞÞ ¼ t which means r can be rewritten as r ¼ r 1 /r i1 /r in /r m ¼ r 1 /t 1 /t n /r m . And the insertion function can be designed as follows: f str I ðtÞ ¼ f I ðε; t 1 Þ f I ðt 1 ; t 2 Þ/f I ðt 1 t 2 t nÀ1 ; t n Þ ¼ r 1 /r i1À1 ; t 1 ; r i1þ1 /r i2À1 ; t 2 /; r i ðn À 1Þ þ 1/r inÀ1 ; t n ¼ r 1 /r in 2r m . The computing method of insertion function set F I (r, t) when P sÀh (r/t) ¼ t is shown in algorithm 3. According to Line 3 and 4, the computational complexity of algorithm 3 is O(nm).
Problem definition
Normally, designers preset (predefine) part of system's representation as secrets by its importance or possibility of intruder's attention. Due to the particularity of SISM, in this paper, we only consider about CSO, which is: Definition 1. (Current-State-Opacity, CSO) A system G ¼ (X,E,f, X 0 ) is current-state opaque w.r.t. X S 4X and E o 4E if ci2X 0 such that f ði; tÞ4X S ; dj2X 0 ; dt02Lðj; t0Þ such that: (i) f ðj; t0Þ4XyX S and (ii) PðtÞ ¼ Pðt0Þ:Based on definition 1, it is known that opacity will hold if the intruder's observation is always belonged to safe strings denoted as l s , and there is l s 4L s ðGÞ where L s (G) is a sublanguage of L(G) called safe language.As the basic rule of design insertion functions which is to add extra observable events which disguises every unsafe string l usi 4LðGÞ=L s ðGÞ in L(G) as a safe and existing string l si 4L s ðGÞ from the intruder's observation. And if such insertion functions exist, the system is said to be enforced opacity.
According to Definition 1, Algorithm 1 and 2, here we have:
Definition 2. (Enforcing opacity) A unsafe system G ¼ (X,E,f,X 0 ) with secret set X s is able to be enforced opacity, if cl usi 2LðGÞ=L S ðGÞ, there exists l si 2L S ðGÞ, such that P sÀh ððl si Þ=ðl usi ÞÞ^l usi is satisfied and the insertion functions which modified the output behavior as f str I ðl usi Þ ¼ l si are stored in F I (l si ,l usi ).So the core problem of enforcing opacity in this paper is for a given l usi , how to determine the corresponding l si which leads P sÀh ððl si Þ=ðl usi ÞÞ^l usi . And based on Theorem 1, we can consider this problem gradationally. Based on Definition 1, it is shown that the system G with E o ¼ {e 1 ,e 2 ,e 3 } and X s ¼ X sufÀ3 in Fig. 4 is not CSO. And the main work in this paper is how to enforce opacity for such SIS just like G.
Dual insertion function structure
In this paper, we propose a new opacity enforcement structure based on dual insertion functions named as Safetyassured insertion function and Admissibility assured insertion function respectively to protect the secrets in SIS.
For such a non-safety SIS, according to this dual insertion function structure, some unnecessary DCUs are activated and release their data flow in SIS during the unsafe strings to change the output behaviors from the intruder. As we mainly consider such data flow from DCUs, here we simplify G as G ¼ (X,E,f,X 0 ,X ms ), where X ms is the marked states set (which is also the secret set) of G.
4.1. Definition of f IS ,f IA and I 2 eEnforceability Definition 3. (Safety-assured insertion function set, F IS (l cni ,s n )) Given system G ¼ (X,E,f,X 0 ,X ms ), if that for s n 2L m ðGÞ, dl cni 2LðGÞ=L m ðGÞ, such that F IS (l cni ,s n ), such that dM i ðf str IS ðs n ÞÞ ¼ l cni . Here F IS (l cni ,s n ) is named as Safety-assured insertion function set of s n .And the collect of all the possible strings l cni which satisfies Definition 3 is named as Candidate language of s n , and denoted as L cÀsn (G). If L cÀsn (G) ¼ f, s n is impossible to be modified to any safe string by adding events from the output.Which should be mentioned that L(G suf (X ms )) can be treated as the suffix set of all strings which would reveal the secret state belonging to X ms . X suf ÀX ms 4X is the subsequent states set after the happening of secret states.
Definition 4. (Admissibility-assured insertion function set, F IA ðl cniÀk ; l s n Àj Þ). Given a system G ¼ (X,E,f,X 0 ,X ms ) which is able to be repaired to admissibility by F IA ðl cniÀk ; l s n Àj Þ after the modification done by F IS (l cni ,s n ), if for cl s n Àj 2LðG suf ðf ðx 0 ; s n ÞÞÞ, there exists l cniÀk 2LðG suf ( f(x 0 ,l cni ))), such that M i ðf str IA ðl s n Àj ÞÞ ¼ l cniÀk . Here F IA (l cniÀk , l s n Àj Þ is named as an Admissibility-assured insertion function set paired with F IS (l cni ,s n ).Based on the definition of P sÀh ((r)/(t)), the twotiered insertion mechanism which can enforce opacity we proposed in this paper named as enforceability that could be defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Enforceability, I 2 eEnforceability) Given system G ¼ (X,E,f, X 0 ,X ms ), such dual insertion function structure is called I 2 eEnforcing if cs n 2L m ðGÞ and cl s n Àj 2 LðG suf ðf ðx 0 ; s n ÞÞÞ, there exists l cni 2LðGÞ=L s ðGÞ, such that P sÀh ((l cni )/(s n )) ¼ s n (Safety) and dl cniÀk 2LðG suf ðf ðx 0 ; l cni ÞÞÞ such that P sÀh ((l cniÀk )/(l snÀj )) ¼ l snÀj (Admissibility).
Computing method of safety-assured insertion function set
As what has proofed in Lemma 1 and Algorithm 2, for a given string s, we can always modified it to l i by adding extra events iff there is P sÀh ððl i Þ=ðsÞÞ^s and these extra events can be always determined by F I (l i ,s). Here if s is unsafe but l i is safe, F I (l i ,s) would be a suitable safety-assured insertion function set. Which means for a unsafe string s, we can determine F IS (l i ,s) by finding a safe l i which satisfies P sÀh ððl i Þ=ðsÞÞ^s. In most case, there may exist several safe strings meet the assumption above and in this paper we put them in candidate language L c (G). The computing process of L c (G) is shown in Algorithm 4.
The algorithm takes the initiation unsafe string s and language L s (G) as input. Line 1 differentiating each string in L s (G) by adding a subscript, and preset the candidate language L c (G) which includes every strings of L s (G). Lines 2e8, show the way to identify the safe strings which can be modified by adding extra events from s based on Lemma 1, and each strings are remarked in Line 9. Lines 10e17, make a further screening of L c (G) which only reserve the most simplified and satisfactory prefixes of each strings in L c (G). If L ci (G) ¼ f is satisfied, G is impossible to be enforced opacity by adding extra events (Not I 2 eEnforcing). The output of this algorithm is the candidate language L c (G). And by choosing the string l ci from L c (G) such F IS (l ci ,s) must exist which can prevent the reveal of secret. According to Fig. 4 , it is shown that the initiation unsafe string is s ¼ e 1 . Based on Line 2e8 in Algorithm 4, L c (G) in Line 9 is {e 2 e 1 , e 3 e 2 e 1 ; e 3 e 2 ðe 1 =e 4 Þ ½e 3 e 2 e 
Ã 2 e 1 g should be deleted from L c (G) because of the existence of string e 3 e 2 e 1 . The result of candidate language in Line 21 is L c (G) ¼ {e 2 e 1 ,e 3 e 2 e 1 }. And all the possible safety-assured insertion function set F IS of G which can protect secret x s are F IS (e 2 e 1 ,e 1 ) ¼ {f IS (ε,e 1 ) ¼ e 2i e 1 } and F IS (e 3 e 2 e 1 ,e 1 ) ¼ {f IS (ε,e 1 ) ¼ e 3i e 2i e 1 }. The next step runs re-examination of these F IS . Due to the nested loop in Line 10 to 15, the computational complexity of algorithm 4 is O(n 2 ).
4.3.
Computing method of admissibility-assured insertion function set 4.3.1. Admissibility-assured insertion function set After screening every possible strings in L(G) which can be used in the construction of safety-assured insertion function set, and in this subsection we will determine whether a string l ci in L c (G) is suitable to enforce opacity which is denoted as I 2 eEnforcing through l ci . We select each candidate string in L c (G) by turn, and search Admissibility-assured insertion function set, F IA , which can polish every modified output behaviors back to normal strings, meanwhile, collect these two kind of strings in pair in a set CL(G).
Algorithm 5 shows the searching algorithmic of CL(G).
The algorithm takes as input the initiation unsafe string s and candidate language L c (G) which is marked in Line 1. Line 2 initialize suffix subsystem G suf (x s ), as x s is the secret state of G, that means L(G suf (x s )) includes all the strings which can lead s$l sj to a unsafe string. Or said differently, every strings in L(G)/L s (G) can be denoted as s$l sj where l sj 2G suf ðx s Þ. The Non-prefix l sj 2L pre ðG suf ðx s ÞÞ means l sj is not a prefix of any other strings in L(G suf (x s )). It could consider that language L(G) is build up by several Non-prefix strings and their prefixes, so does the each suffix subsystem of L(G). Based on F SA , when s happens, the intruder is deceived to observe such output l ci which belongs to L c (G). That is the reason why system could be safe. To enforce admissibility, such insertion function sets should exist that modifies each string l ci $l sj looks normal by the intruder. For a string x ci in L c (G), Line 4e5 define its suffix subsystem G suf (x ci ). The intruder can only accept such output behaviors after the happening of s if it has been defined in G suf (x ci ). As L(G suf (x s )) is fixed, Line 6e27 works like a deeper screening to sort out an acceptable l ci by estimating constructibility from L(G suf (x s )) to L(G suf (x ci )). Based on Lemma 1, Algorithm 3 and Theorem 2, if there exists l ci 2L c ðGÞ and for every non-prefix l sj 2LðG suf ðx s ÞÞ in Line 11, there exists l cik 2LðG suf ðx ci ÞÞ, such that P sÀh ((l cik )/ (l sj )) ¼ l sj , the admissibility-assured insertion function set F IA (l cik ,l sj ) exists. And the correspondences between each l cik and l sj are saved in CL(G). In order to decrease the quantity of calculation Line 7e8, a prejudging method of remove unsuitable candidate strings from L c (G) is provided. The computational complexity of Algorithm 5 is O( pw), where w is the size of L nÀpre (G suf (x s )).
According to Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5, for a system G, when a unsafe string sl sj is happening, the modified output behaviors received by the intruder are l ci l cik 2LðGÞ which is determined by F IS (s,c i ) and F IA (l sj ,l cik ), the system is I 2 eEnforcing. And such modification is denoted as f isÀia (sl sj ) ¼ l ci l cik and stored in an insertion function set F ISÀIA (G À l ci ).
a. Searching result of CL(G) when choosing l c1 Fig. 5 shows the Suffix subsystem G suf (x 10 ). It can been seen that E sufÀe2e1 ¼ {e 3 } and E suf Àe 1 ⊄E suf Àe 2 e 1 . Some strings in G suf (x 3 ) included specific alphabets that G suf (x 10 ) does not have. That means it is impossible to modify every strings in G suf (x 3 ) to a string which exists in G suf (x 10 ) by adding extra events. For this reason, G is not I 2 eEnforcing through e 2 e 1 .
b. Searching result of CL(G) when choosing l c2
Then the Algorithm 5 starts to calculate whether l c2 is suitable or not. Fig. 6 shows the Suffix subsystem G suf (x 13 ). It can been seen that E sufÀe3e2e1 ¼ {e 1 ,e 2 ,e 3 } which is equal to E sufÀe1 , that means l c2 passes the prejudging method in Line 7e8. And then the non-prefix string set of L(G suf (x s )) is worked out as fe 3 e 1 e Ã 3 ; e 3 e 2 e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 g, the core computing starts. After counting every strings in L(G suf (x 13 )), the result shows that G is I 2 eEnforcing through e 3 e 2 e 1 and CLðGÞ ¼ ½e 3 e 1 e 
Structure of dual insertion function set
The structure of dual insertion functions we proposed in this paper is shown in Fig. 7 .
Here we use two kinds of insertion function set F IS and F IA to enforce opacity. For the secret state x s , the first step is to determine the initiation unsafe string s where x s ¼ f(x 0 ,s), and s is the prefix of all the unsafe strings in L(G)/L s (G) which can reveal the secret x s . And then, for the second step, we acquire and collect all the possible strings which can be modified by insertion function from s in a subset of L(G) named candidate language L c (G). And these kind of insertion function which is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret behaviors from a unsafe one is named as Safety-assured insertion function, f IS . If L c (G) is a null set, G is impossible to be enforced opacity by adding extra events (Not I 2 eEnforcing). If L c (G) is not null, in step 3, we select each candidate string in L c (G) by turn, and search such insertion functions named as Admissibility-assured insertion functions, f IA which can polish every modified output behaviors back to normal strings, meanwhile, collecting these two kind of strings in pair in a set CL(G) and at this situation G is I 2 eEnforcing, otherwise it is not.
Optimizing
Actually, based on the computation mode above, for nonsafe system G there may exist several options to enforce opacity. As in this paper, every addition event is physically done by realising data flow in SIS network which would cause a waste of network resources. Therefore, optimization is extremely important to consider. Here we proposed 3 principles to comparing each solution. Fig. 6 . Suffix subsystem G suf (x 13 ). Fig. 7 . Structure of dual insertion functions. Rule (a). For two candidate string l ca and l cb which both have the ability to build I 2 eEnforcing insertion function structure, if n ca >n cb , choosing F ISÀIA (G À l cb ), and vice versa, where n ca and n cb are the sum of inserted events for each unsafe string in G based on l ca and l cb , respectively.
According to Algorithmic 4 and 5, l ca and l cb are two basic solution can be used in the computing of corresponding admissibility-assured insertion function set. Rule (a) brings a selection method which can economize valuable network resources with its best from the point of reducing unexpected releasing actions.
, delete l sj À l cip from CL(G) and vice versa.
According to Algorithmic 5, there is P sÀh (l cip / l sj ) ¼ P sÀh (l ciq /l sj ) ¼ l sj , which means secret string l sj can be hidden and modified into l cip and l ciq by different insertion functions. Therefore l cip and l ciq are functionally equivalent. As for a l sj , only one corresponding pair is necessary in CL(G), the string with longer length should be deleted to reduce the times of releasing actions.
Due to rule (b) above, the CL(G) is simplified as CLðGÞ ¼ ½e 3 e 1 e Ã 3 À ½e 3 e 2 e 2 e 3 e 1 e Ã 3 , e 3 e 2 e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 À ½e 3 e 2 e 2 e 1 e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 . As there is only one qualified candidate string remained, this CL(G) is the only solution to enforce opacity for the SISM in Fig. 4 .
Ground on Algorithm 2, 3 and Theorem1, 2, 3, there is the safety-assured insertion function set F IS ¼ [f is (ε,e 1 )] ¼ [(e 3i e 2i e 1 )] and the admissibility-assured insertion function set F IA ¼ [f ia (ε, e 3 ), f ia (e 3 ,e 1 ), f ia (e 3 e 1 ,e 3 ), f ia (e 3 e 1 e Ã 3 ; e 3 Þ, f ia (e 3 , e 2 ), f ia (e 3 e 2 , e 3 ), f ia (e 3 e 2 e 3 ,e 1 ), f ia (e 3 e 2 e 3 e 1 ,e 2 ), f ia (e 3 e 2 e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 ; e 2 Þ ¼ ½ðe 3 Þ; (e 3 e 2i e 2i e 3i e 1 ), (e 3 e 2i e 2i e 3i e 1 e 3 ), ðe 3 e 2i e 2i e 3i e 1 e Ã 3 Þ, (e 3 e 2 ), (e 3 e 2 e 2i e 1i e 3 ), (e 3 e 2 e 2i e 1i e 3 e 1 ), (e 3 e 2 e 2i e 1i e 3 e 1 e 2 ), ðe 3 e 2 e 2i e 1i e 3 e 1 e Ã 2 Þ. And the insertion function for each unsafe string in G is confirmable listed in Table 2 .
The result shows that the power failure state (x 3 ) and reconfiguration mission (x 4 À x 8 ) is hidden by normal ship motion control mission safety and admissibility. This SISM is "I 2 eEnforceability".
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a dual layer mechanism based on two types of insertion function named Safety-assured insertion function ( f IS ) and Admissibility-assured insertion function ( f IA ) to enforce opacity for ship information system where f IS is designed to confuse intruder by constructing a non-secret behaviors from a unsafe one, and the division of f IA is to polish the modified output behaviors back to normal. We define the property of "I 2 eEnforceability" that dual layer insertion functions has the ability to enforce opacity. Given a SIS mission model, we propose an algorithm to select f IS and compute its matchable f IA . As it is a large and heavy computing work to test the safety and admissibility of each possible insertion function, dislike the opacity enforceability research before, the paramount consideration in this paper is for a non-safe output behavior sl sj which could be modified as safe string l ci l cik . Then based on the unsafe string sl sj and its acceptable modification l ci l cik , the necessary extra activated DCUs during each secret mission process are able to be determined by the result of F ISÀIA (G À l ci ). Meanwhile, several principles are proposed in the compare of all possible solution to find the easiest method to enforce opacity. The computing process is easy to implement and high-efficiency.
Based on the structure of dual insertion function proposed in this paper, we are interested in the following research points.
Enforcing opacity for a system with unfixed secret
In previous research, the secret is always given and fixed. However, for some intruders, their interest points may be changed based on the system's previous process (internal incentive). For example, the activation of fire lader is a secret only if some weapons has already activated. Meanwhile, SIS would revise its guard point under certain external circumstances (external incentive, such as cyber-attack, etc.). In view of the above-mentioned incentives, these systems should have the adaptability to protect their unfixed secrets.
Imperfect information releasing issue in multi-task mode
In this paper, we assume that a DCU will send all required information in a single data flow. However, if the length of each data flow is fixed and limited, it is impossible to add all necessary information at once. Imperfect information releasing issue should be considered.
